博弈论及其应用学术会议

11月7日（周四）

一、            报告时间

2019年11月7日15:00-17:00

二、            报告地点

山东大学中心校区知新楼B1032

三、            主办单位

中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会网络科学分会

四、            承办单位

山东大学数学学院

山东大学社会超网络计算与决策模拟实验室

五、            会议内容

1.      报告题目：Self-Evident Events and the Value of Linking

报告摘要：We propose a theory of linking in long-term relationships based on what information becomes self-evident in equilibrium at the end of a stage game. We obtain a tight bound on the average per-period efficiency loss that must be incurred to enforce a stage-game outcome throughout a T-period repeated game when T is large. Our results apply to all monitoring structures and strategy profiles. They encompass the inefficiency result in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), as well as the approximate-efficiency results in Compte (1998), Obara (2009), and Chan and Zhang (2016).

报告人简介：张文章，浙江大学百人计划研究员、博士生导师。曾在Journal of Economic Theory、Theoretical Economics发表学术论文。

2.      报告题目：Designing Weighted and Directed Networks under Complementarities

报告摘要：A planner designs a network with weighted and directed links on which a group of agents play a game with complementarities. A network is optimal if it maximizes an increasing objective function in each agent's effort subject to the planner's available budget. We show that all optimal networks are generalized nested split graphs (GNSGs) in which agents are ordered by “link-dominance”. If link cost is linear, every connected optimal network exhibits a leader-follower division of labor such that a small number of agents, the leaders, influence all the rest to work hard. If link cost is strictly convex, there can be a strict link-dominance ordering between ex ante identical agents. Additionally, we study a non-cooperative network formation game and show that equilibrium networks are inefficient GNSGs.

报告人简介：李学恒，南京审计大学助理教授，研究领域：行为经济学，应用微观理论，网络经济学。

3.      报告题目：Selling Mechanism with Passive Reassignment

报告摘要：A seller produces and sells products to consumers of mass one through a selling mechanism. Consumers are endowed with bi-dimensional private information on their own values and entry costs. Each consumer demands up to one unit of the product. We study both efficient and revenue-maximizing selling mechanisms with passive reassignment, which allows the possibility of allocating the products to non-participating consumers.

报告人简介：冯欣，南京大学助理教授。曾担任Economic Inquiry、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Social Choice and Welfare等经济学期刊匿名审稿人。研究成果发表于Journal of Public Economics, Economics Letters等经济学学术期刊。

六、            邀请人：徐进    数学学院副研究员