报告题目：Ex-ante fair random allocation

报告人：韩翔  上海财经大学

报告时间：2018年10月23日 16:00-17:00

报告地点：知新楼B1032

报告摘要：When allocating indivisible objects,  agents might have equal priority rights for some objects. A common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic allocation mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose a concept of ex-ante fairness and show the existence of an agent-optimal ex-ante fair solution. Ex-ante fair random allocations are generated using “allocation by division”, a new method of generating random allocations from deterministic allocation mechanisms. Some important results from the two-sided matching theory and the recent random assignment literature are unified and extended. The set of ex-ante fair random allocations forms a complete lattice under first-order stochastic dominance relations. The agent-optimal ex-ante fair mechanism includes both the deferred acceptance algorithm and the probabilistic serial mechanism as special cases.

报告人简介：韩翔，上海财经大学经济学院副教授，美国南卫理公会大学博士。主要研究方向为微观经济理论，匹配理论与市场机制设计。其研究成果发表在博弈论顶级期刊Games and Economic Behavior。

邀请人：徐进