题目：Stabilizability Of Game-Based Control Systems

主讲人：张人仁

摘要：We investigate the stabilizability of Nash equilibrium of the linear-quadratic game based control system (GBCS), which was first introduced to model control systems whose structures involve rational agents, such as social, economic, and "intelligent" systems. The GBCS has a hierarchical decision-making structure: one regulator and multiple rational agents. The regulator is regarded as the global controller and makes the decision first, and then the agents try to optimize their respective objective functions to reach a possible Nash equilibrium as a result of noncooperative dynamic games. The stabilizability problem is whether the regulator can stabilize the system by regulating the Nash equilibrium formed by the agents at the lower level. In this paper, we will first formulate the stabilizability problem of the linear-quadratic GBCS. Some explicit necessary and (or) sufficient algebraic conditions on the stabilizability of GBCS are given by investigating the solvability relationship between the associated algebraic Riccati equations (AREs), the algebraic Riccati inequalities (ARIs), and the linear-quadratic differential games, which is a key technical difficulty of this paper.

报告人简介：张人仁，山东大学数学与交叉科学研究中心担任副研究员，博士毕业于中国科学院大学，2018年至2020年在中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院做博士后。2020年7月起在山东大学任教，主要从事最优控制以及博弈控制系统的研究。近年来在《National Science Review》、《SIAM J. Control Optim.》、《IEEE Trans. Automat. Control》等期刊上发表多篇论文。

时间：2021年11月11日（周四） 14:00-15:00

地点：腾讯会议，会议ID：366 606 608

邀请人：于永渊